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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate how the modularity of model and real-world social networks 
affect their robustness and the efficacy of node attack (removal) strategies based on node 
degree (ID) and node betweenness (IB). We build Barabasi-Albert model networks with 
different modularity by a new ad hoc algorithm that rewire links forming networks with 
community structure. We traced the network robustness using the largest connected 
component (LCC). We find that higher level of modularity decreases the model network 
robustness under both attack strategies, i.e. model network with higher community structure 
showed faster LCC disruption when subjected to node removal. Very interesting, we find that 
when model networks showed non-modular structure or low modularity, the degree-based 
(ID) is more effective than the betweenness-based node attack strategy (IB). Conversely, in 
the case the model network present higher modularity, the IB strategies becomes clearly the 
most effective to fragment the LCC. Last, we investigated how the modularity of the network 
structure evaluated by the modularity indicator (Q) affect the robustness and the efficacy of 
the attack strategies in 12 real-world social networks. We found that the modularity Q is 
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negatively correlated with the robustness of the real-world social networks under IB node 
attack strategy (p-value< 0.001). This result indicates how real-world networks with higher 
modularity (i.e. with higher community structure) may be more fragile to betwenness-based 
node attack. The results presented in this paper unveil the role of modularity and community 
structure for the robustness of networks and may be useful to select the best node attack 
strategies in network. 
 
Introduction 
The study of real-world complex networks has attracted much attention in recent decades 
because a large number of complex systems in the real world can be considered as complex 
networks, such as social (Borgatti et al. 2009, Bellingeri et al. 2020), technological (Albert et 
al. 1999, Faloutsos et al. 1999), biological (Jeong et al. 2000, Barra et al. 2010), ecological 
complex systems (Bellingeri and Bodini 2013; Bellingeri and Vincenzi 2013). Many real-world 
networks show a scale-free structure, making them resilient to random node failure (Cohen et 
al. 2000) but can disintegrate quickly when a small proportion of important nodes are removed 
(Albert et al. 1999). The network’s robustness, which evaluates the capability of network to 
hold its functioning under such failures or attacks has drawn extensive attention in recent years 
(Albert and Barabási 2002; Cohen et al. 2000; Callaway et al. 2000; Iyer et al. 2013; Bellingeri 
et al. 2015; Bellingeri et al. 2014; Dall’Asta et al. 2006; Nguyen and Nguyen 2018; Wandelt 
et al. 2018; Bellingeri et al. 2019;2020). Usually, Monte-Carlo simulation is used to evaluate 
the network robustness: for random failure, nodes/edges are removed with the same probability 
(random removal), while for intentional attack, nodes/edges are removed according to different 
structural properties of the network and a robustness measure is then computed during the 
node/edge removal simulation (Albert et al. 2000; Cohen et al. 2000, 2001; Bellingeri et al. 
2020; Lekha and Balakrishnan 2020). To identify the node/edge removal strategy that triggers 
the greatest amount of damage in the system is also highly important for revealing the 
links/nodes that act as key players in network functioning with many practical applications 
(Bellingeri et al. 2020). For example, the understanding of how the node/edge removal affects 
real social systems may predict how the abandoning of individuals affects the information 
spread in the social network, thus individuating the “influential spreaders” in the network, such 
as most important scholars or influencers (Ahajjam and Badir 2018; Bellingeri et al. 2020). On 
the other hand, in social contact network on which a disease can spread, it is critical to 
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understand how node removal through vaccination affects the spread of the disease to 
efficiently prevent an epidemic (Holme 2004; Wang et al. 2015; Bellingeri et al. 2020).  
One of the most important measure of network robustness is the size of the largest connected 
component (LCC), i.e. the LCC is the highest number of connected nodes in the network 
(Albert et al. 2000). The LCC gives us a simple interpretation of the system robustness when 
subjected to node/edge removal accounting the largest functioning part of the network. For 
example, if the Internet is attacked, all nodes (servers) within the LCC can still transfer 
information mutually and indicating the largest networked structure still active. Another 
example, in a social contact network, the LCC represents the highest number of individuals 
that can be affected by a disease spreading (Bellingeri et al. 2019). For this reason, the most 
efficient node attack strategy is the one that is able to induce the fastest LCC decrease (Figure 
1), and numerical simulations have shown that attack strategies based on network’s nodes 
centrality measures can effectively individuating the most important nodes to reduce the size 
of the LCC (Albert et al. 2000, Cohen et al. 2000, 2001, Callaway et al. 2000; Iyer et al. 2013; 
Bellingeri et al 2018; Bellingeri et al. 2014; Nguyen and Nguyen 2018; Wandelt et al. 2018). 
In specific, overall findings showed that nodes attack strategies based on betweenness 
centrality are highly efficient to dismantle the LCC (Iyer et al. 2013, Bellingeri et al. 2014; Sun 
et al. 2017, Nguyen and Nguyen 2018; Wandelt et al. 2018), especially for real-world networks. 
However, the difference in the effectiveness varied considerably among different real-world 
networks (Iyer et al. 2013; Bellingeri et al. 2014; Wandelt et al. 2020).  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic behavior of the size of the LCC as a function of the proportion of remaining nodes 
p during a node removal process: A) LCC shows a continuous 2nd order decreases without abrupt 
decrease and B) LCC is subjected to first-order percolation phase transition (Achilioptas et al. 2009) 
showing an abrupt decrease in correspondence of p=pc. The node attack strategy in B is able to dismantle 
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the network with a small proportion of removed nodes, i.e. is the most effective to decrease the LCC, 
thus individuating the most important nodes in network. 
The mechanism that gives rise to such an abrupt decrease is studied using percolation theory 
and is assigned to the first-order percolation phase transition (Achilioptas et al. 2009, Riordan 
et al. 2011, Cho et al. 2013). However, the question whether such an abrupt decrease occurs 
for a certain real network under attack remain unclear. This question is of great importance 
from two aspects: on one hand, if we want to break a network using node removal, we would 
find strategies that remove nodes that can cause such abrupt and fast decrease in LCC’s size. 
On the other hand, if we want to protect a network, we must design it in a way that such abrupt 
decrease should not happen. Since the network robustness must depend on its topology, several 
studies have investigated the relationship between topological metrics and the robustness of a 
network.  
Iyer et al. (2013) studied robustness of model networks with power-law and exponential degree 
distribution, with various node clustering coefficient (or node transitivity) level. They found 
that increasing the clustering coefficient of the network nodes results in decreasing robustness 
to node attack with the most dramatic effect being displayed for node attack based on their 
degree and betweenness. The authors also suggested for increasing the robustness, it is 
necessary to design topological structures with low clustering coefficient as is consistent with 
the functional requirements of the network. Their simulation on real-world networks also show 
that the difference in the effectiveness between strategies varied across networks.  
Nguyen and Trang (2019) studied the Facebook social networks and found those networks with 
higher modularity Q have lower robustness to node removal. The modularity indicator Q 
introduced by Newman and Girvan (2004) measures how well a network breaks into 
communities, (i.e. a community or module in a network is a well-connected group of nodes 
which have sparser connections with the nodes outside the group). Networks with high 
modularity Q have dense connections (more links) among the nodes within modules but sparse 
connections (few links) among nodes from different modules. Therefore, the modularity Q is 
higher in networks with marked community structure, which are called modular networks 
(Girvan and Newman 2002). 
Using percolation theory, Dong et al. (2018) pointed out that in a modular network, a small 
fraction of nodes that connect nodes of different modules, called ‘interconnected nodes’, is 
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critical to the robustness of the network. By analyzing the LCC size during node removal 
process by varying the fraction of interconnected nodes (r) in the network, they found that LCC 
scale with r by a power-law with universal criticality. This result suggests that modular network 
with higher fraction of interconnected nodes (therefore low modularity Q because the fraction 
of links between nodes in the same modules is lower) will result in a lower LCC decrease 
during node removal and consequently higher network robustness.  
Shai et al. (2015) developed both analytical and simulation analyses for evaluating the 
robustness of random and scale-free model networks with modular structure (Shai et al. 2015). 
They simulate the attack of interconnected nodes, i.e. nodes that connect to neighbors that are 
in other modules, and analyze the critical node occupation probability pc, i.e. the fraction of 
remaining p when a large decrease in LCC occurs, as a function of the number of modules m 
and the ratio between probabilities for an intra- and inter-module link α. 
They found that percolation phase transition falls into two regimes depending on the number 
of modules m for a fixed α: 
- For m < m∗ the network presents very high modularity and collapses abruptly under 
node removal (i.e. 1st order phase transition) as a result of the modules becoming 
disconnected from each another, while their internal structure is almost unaffected.  
- In contrast, for m > m∗, the network presents low modularity and the interconnected 
nodes play an important role to maintain the whole network connected when nodes are 
removed. Therefore, the node attack causes lower damage breaking continuously the 
entire system without sharp LCC decrease (i.e. 2nd order phase transition). Put another 
way, m∗ represents the threshold above which the network modular structure vanishes 
and the network returns to behaving as a non-modular network.  
In this work, we analyze how the modularity of scale-free model and real-world social 
networks affects their robustness and the efficacy of the node attack strategies. Using model 
network, we vary the level of modularity by changing the ratio of intra-modules links over 
inter-modules links (κ). We found that the attack strategy based on node betweenness, which 
was found to be the most effective strategy to break the LCC of real-world networks (Wandelt 
et al. 2018; Nguyen et al. 2019), is the best strategy to disrupt the LCC only when κ is higher 
than a given value κc, i.e. when the network has high modularity. Below, when network has 
low modularity Q, or even no modular structure, the attack strategy based on node degree is 
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more effective. In addition, the type of the network percolation phase transition when nodes 
are removed change from a continuous 2nd order (in which LCC has no abrupt decrease) to an 
abrupt 1st order transition (with abrupt LCC decrease) when κ increases. We also examine the 
effect of network’s density (i.e. the average number of links per node) and the number of 
modules on network robustness and found that those parameters affect the network robustness, 
but not the type of the network percolation phase transition (1st or 2nd order) which only 
depends on κ. Finally, we study those effects for a variety of real social networks and we found 
that real social networks with higher modularity Q are less robust when subjected to the attack 
strategy based on nodes betweenness. In other words, the efficacy of the attack strategy based 
on nodes betweenness is higher for real social networks showing higher modularity Q. 
Methods 
A network can be represented as a graph G = (V, E), where V = {1,2,...,N} is the set of N nodes 
(vertices), and E = {eij | i, j ∈ V, i ≠ j} is the set of E links (edges). Networks can be undirected 
when the links have no specified direction, or directed, in the case links present directionality. 
Network are unweighted when only the presence-absence of the links is considered, or 
weighted, in the case some interaction value is associated to the link, i.e. the link weight. 
Undirected and unweighted networks can be abstracted by an adjacency an NxN matrix A 
where element ai,j=1 when there is a link between node i and j and ai,j=0 otherwise. In this 
paper, only undirected and unweighted networks are considered.  
Generation of model scale-free network 
Model scale-free networks with size of N = 10000 nodes are generated using the well-known 
Barabási- Albert (BA) model (Barabasi and Albert 1999). The BA model starts from a small 
clique (a completely connected graph) of N0 nodes. At each successive time step, a new node 
is added and connected to M0 different existing nodes (M0 < N0) with the probability of connect 
an existing node is proportional to its degree (i.e the number of links to the node). The network 
then has a power-law degree distribution P(k)=k-γ with degree exponent γ = 3 (Barabasi and 
Albert 1999). We chose the average node degree <k> between 2 and 32. 
Our model to generate modular scale-free network 
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From the BA network we generated modular networks using a new ad hoc algorithm by re-
wiring links as following: 
- Each node is assigned randomly to a module ci = {1,2,…,m} where m is the total 
number of modules. The number of nodes in each module is approximately N/m.  
- For each link connecting two nodes i and j of different modules ci   cj (inter-modules 
links), we will rewire it with a probability w (and keep it without rewiring with 
probability 1 – w) by the following procedure: 
o We randomly select one node between the two ending nodes of the link, says i, 
and find another node l within the same module of the node i (cl = ci). We then 
detach the inter-modules link between nodes i and j and create a new intra-
module link between nodes i and l. The node l is selected with a probability 
proportioned to its degree (node with higher degree in the module ci has higher 
probability of being selected) 
o If some nodes are isolated in the network after rewiring, they will be removed. 
However, we find that only a negligible proportion of nodes can be isolated 
after the rewiring. 
We show in Appendix A that, as long as N is high enough, this rewiring procedure statistically 
preserve the BA model node degree distribution (scale-free and degree exponent γ = 3).  
Thus, by changing the probability w we can change the ratio κ between the number of intra-
module links Lintra (links that connects two nodes from the same module) and inter-modules 
links Linter (links that connects two nodes of different modules), thus varying the community 
structure of the network. The relation between κ and w can be derived as following: 
- The number of inter-modules links and intra-module links before the rewiring process 
are 
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
𝑁〈𝑘〉 and 
1
𝑚
𝑁〈𝑘〉, respectively.  
- After the rewiring process, the number of inter-modules links become (1 −
𝑤)
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
𝑁〈𝑘〉 and the number of intra-modules links become (
1
𝑚
+ 𝑤
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
)𝑁〈𝑘〉 
- The ratio between the number of intra-module links (Lintra) and inter-modules links 
(Linter) become 
𝜅 =
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
=
1 + 𝑤(𝑚 − 1)
(1 − 𝑤)(𝑚 − 1)
=
𝑚
(1 − 𝑤)(𝑚 − 1)
− 1 
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which is a monotone function of w when m > 1. 
- We derive α, the ratio between the probability for a given link to be intra-link (pintra) 
over that for a given link to be inter-link (pinter) as in (Shai et al 2015) by: 
𝛼 =
𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎
𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
 ~ (𝑚 − 1)
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
=
𝑚
(1 − 𝑤)
− (𝑚 − 1) 
which is also a monotone function of w when m > 1. 
The monotone change of κ and α as function of w was confirmed with simulation results which 
are shown in Appendix B. 
Thus increasing w, we increase the modularity of the network, i.e. increasing w we marked the 
network community structure. Figure 2 presents example of modular network with m = 5 and 
different value w, created from the initial network with N = 10000 and the average degree of 
<k> = 8. 
Initial network w = 0.9 w = 0.98 w = 0.995 
    
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Figure 2: Visualization of the model for generating scale-free modular networks. The modularity of the 
network increases from A to D.  (A) initial non-modular scale-free BA network of size N = 10000 with 
average degree <k> = 8. (B)-(D): Illustration of the increasing modularity effect of w on the obtained 
modular network divided into m = 5 modules.  
The node attack strategies 
The network generated above will be exposed to two node attack (removal) simulation 
processes (or node attack strategy) where a p proportion of nodes with lowest centrality 
measures are kept and q = 1-p proportion of highest centrality measure nodes are removed 
together with their links: 
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- The first attack strategy removes nodes according to their degree, i.e. the number of 
links to it, as centrality measure and it is called initial degree (ID) based attack strategy 
(Albert and Barabasi 2002, Bellingeri et al. 2014, Wandelt et al. 2018).  
- The second strategy uses a macro-scale network metric, the node betweenneess, which 
is the number of times that a node appears in the shortest paths among all nodes pairs 
in the network (Brandes 2001). This method is commonly used to break real-world 
networks and is called initial node betweenneess attack strategy (IB) (Bellingeri et al. 
2014; Wandelt et al. 2018).  
The network robustness measures  
To measure the robustness of the network under nodes attack we traced the size of first largest 
connected component 1st LCC and the second 2nd LCC as a function of p.  Further, for each 
attack simulation, we compute a single value defined as the network robustness (R) as done in 
Bellingeri et al. (2019a). The value of R is the average of the normalized sized of the 1st LCC 
(normalized by the initial number of node N) along the removal process. R can range between 
two theoretical extremes, R ≃ 0 (absolute fragile network) and R≃1 (absolute robust network).  
In addition, we identify the critical value of occupation probability pc as the largest value of p 
where LCC has an abrupt decrease, as shown in Figure 1B. In the case no abrupt decrease was 
found (Figure 1A), we compute pc using the “Molloy-Reed” criterion (Callaway et al. 2000; 
Cohen et al. 2000), which states that the network loses its overall connectivity when each node 
in the network has less than two links on average. It translates to the mathematic condition of 
<k2>/<k> < 2, where <k> is the node degree. Thus, the higher are R and the lower pc the more 
robust is network under node attack. As a consequence, when comparing the efficacy of the 
node attack strategies, the higher are R and lower pc, the lower is the efficacy of the strategy to 
disrupt the LCC. We then denote pc
ID and pc
IB the node occupation probability against ID and 
IB node attack strategies, respectively; as well as we denote RID and RIB the network robustness 
against ID and IB node attack strategies, respectively.   
Real-world social networks dataset 
In addition to model networks, we analyze 12 real-world social networks, in which 8 are 
networks of Facebook's pages where nodes represent pages of different topics - TV Shows, 
Politician, Government, Public Figures, Athletes, Company, New sites and Artist - and links 
are mutual likes between them. The Facebook’s pages data is collected from 
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https://snap.stanford.edu, prepared by (Rozemberczki et al. 2019). Beside, we use two financial 
networks where nodes represent the US SP500 stocks and links are calculated from the 
correlation matrix using threshold method (see Nguyen et al. 2019  for more detail); the co-
authorship network of scientists working on network theory and experiment (NetScience) 
where nodes represent authors and link’s weight represents the number of common papers 
(Newman 2003; Boccaletti et al. 2006); and the Email network of people in a large European 
Research Institution (Email) where nodes represent researchers and links indicate that at least 
one email was sent between two researchers (Leskovec et al. 2007; Yin et al. 2017). 
Table 1 summarizes the following statistics of the real-world social networks: 
Node degree: is the number of links to the node (Boccaletti et al. 2006). The degree of 
node i is given by: 
 i ij
j i N
k a
 
   
where aij=1 in the case there is a link connecting nodes i and j and is 0 otherwise; the 
term N means the sum is over all nodes in the network.  
- Modularity: The modularity indicator Q calculates how modular is a given division of 
a network into subnetworks (modules or communities): 
 
,
1
 ( ) ( , )
2 2
i j
ij i j
i j
k k
Q a c c
L L
   
where L is the number of links, aij is the element of the A adjacency matrix in row i and 
column j, ki is the degree of i, kj is the degree of j, ci is the module (or community) of i, 
cj that of j, the sum goes over all i and j pairs of nodes, and δ(x, y) is 1 if x = y and 0 
otherwise (Clauset et al. 2004). 
- LCC: the largest connected component (also called ‘giant cluster’) represents the 
maximum number of connected nodes in the network (Boccaletti et al. 2006; Bellingeri 
et al. 2020). Considering all the network clusters, i.e. the sub-networks of connected 
nodes, the LCC can be defined: 
 
 max ( )j jLCC S   
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where Sj is the size (number of nodes) of the j-th cluster. 
- Diameter: the diameter of the network (D) is the longest shortest path length of all pairs 
of nodes in the network, also called the longest geodesic (Newman 2013) 
- Transitivity: the transitivity (C) is based on triplets of nodes. A triplet is three nodes 
that are connected by either two (open triplet) or three (closed triplet) undirected edges. 
The transitivity is the number of closed triplets (or 3 x triangles) over the total number 
of triplets (both open and closed). In formula: 
 closed
total
C


  
 where λclosed is the number of closed triples and λtotal is the number of all possible triples 
in the network. Transitivity represents the overall probability for the network to have 
adjacent nodes interconnected, thus making more tightly connected modules (Newman 
et al. 2002) 
- Link Density: the link density (Density) is number of links divided by the total number 
of possible links (Boccaletti et al. 2006). 
 
Networks N L LCC  LCC(%) <k> D C Density Q 
TV Shows 3,892 17,262 3,892 100% 4.4 20.0 0.443 0.00228 0.830 
Politician  5,908 41,729 5,908 100% 7.1 14.0 0.429 0.00239 0.815 
Government 7,057 89,455 7,057 100% 12.7 10.0 0.433 0.00358 0.614 
Public Figures 11,565 67,114 11,565 100% 5.8 15.0 0.215 0.00100 0.645 
Athletes 13,866 86,858 13,866 100% 6.3 11.0 0.303 0.00090 0.637 
Company  14,113 52,310 14,113 100% 3.7 15.0 0.287 0.00053 0.656 
New sites 27917 206,259 27,917 100% 16.2 15.0 0.138 0.00052 0.529 
Artist 50,515 819,306 50,515 100% 7.4 11.0 0.295 0.00064 0.457 
SP500_1 315 8,706 315 100% 27.6 6.0 0.511 0.08802 0.253 
SP500_2 371 10,636 369 99% 28.7 6.0 0.718 0.07748 0.373 
NetScience 1,589 2,742 379 24% 1.7 17.0 0.878 0.00109 0.954 
Email_EU 1,005 16,064 986 98% 16.0 7.0 0.450 0.01592 0.341 
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Table 1: Structural statistics of the real-world social networks: nodes (N), links (L), size of the LCC, 
size of the LCC as % with respect the total number of network nodes, average node degree <k>, 
diameter, transitivity, the edge density, modularity Q. 
Results 
Robustness of non-modular scale-free network 
We simulate scale-free network of size N = 10000 nodes and average degree <k> = 4 and run 
attack simulation using ID and IB strategies. The 1st LCC decreases continuously under both 
strategies and the network is completely broken down (i.e. the LCC shrinks to quasi zero) at a 
critical occupation probability pc (0.62 and 0.56 for ID and IB, respectively), as seen in Figure 
3A. At this transition, we also found that the 2nd LCC has its maximum value as shown in 
Figure 3B. Such phase transitions are called ‘continuous phase transitions’ or ‘second-order 
phase transitions’ and denote robust network (see Mnyukh 2013). Interestingly, while overall 
findings showed that nodes attack strategies based on betweenness centrality are highly 
efficient for most real-world networks (Bellingeri et al. 2014; Iyer et al, 2013; Nguyen and 
Nguyen 2018; Wandelt et al. 2018), our results shown different conclusion. For scale-free 
network without modular structures (lower value of parameter w), betweenness-based strategy 
IB does not perform better than the degree-based strategy ID. For scale-free network with 
significant modular structures (higher value of parameter w), betweenness-based strategy IB 
clearly performs better than the degree-based strategy ID. It is therefore arguable that the 
presence of modular structure in networks is an important factor enhancing the efficacy of 
betweenneess-based attack strategy for breaking the 1st LCC, as shown in the next sub-section. 
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Figure 3: Simulation result for the non-modular network with N = 10000 nodes and average degree 
<k> = 4: A) Size of the first largest connected component (1st LCC) and B) the second largest 
connected component (2nd LCC) as a function of the occupation probability p.  
Robustness of modular scale-free network 
We first present the robustness of the network of different modularity by varying the re-wiring 
ratio w, then we discuss the robustness of the network with different node average degree <k> 
and number of modules m. 
Robustness as a function of the modularity 
We simulate scale-free network of size N = 10000 nodes with m = 5 modules and average 
degree <k> = 4, then applying the rewiring method with increasing w. At first when w is small 
(and the network presents low modularity), we found that the network is resilient and the pc 
remains approximately equivalent value as with original non-modular network for both ID and 
IB attack strategies (Figure 4). At this degree of modularity, the network is still homogenous 
enough with a high number of inter-modules links. In consequence, when the attack strategies 
remove nodes the 1st LCC continuously become smaller but still hold the connection between 
modules, denoting higher network robustness against node attack. 
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Only when w is higher than 0.95 the network become fragile and the 1st LCC abruptly decreases 
at some value of p, as seen in Figure 4A and B when the network is attacked by the IB and ID 
strategies, respectively. This value of w = 0.95 corresponds to the ratio between the number of 
intra-module links and inter-modules links κc = 23.8 (for m= 5). At this point the connection 
between modules in network is sparse enough and the removal of critical nodes may break 
down the global connectivity among modules even though the modules are still relatively well 
connected. We call pc the largest value of p with an abrupt decrease of the 1
st LCC, as proposed 
by (Shai et al. 2015), and show its relationship with w in Figure 5A. This transition corresponds 
to a first-order phase transition where local structures are separated from the 1st LCC (denoting 
lower network robustness). As a result, the size of the 2nd LCC abruptly increase at pc and 
gradually decrease afterward (see Figure 4C and D).  
  
Figure 4: Simulation result for modular networks generated from BA network with N = 10000, m = 5 
and <k> = 4 with different value of rewiring probability w: Size of the first largest connected cluster 
(1st LCC) and the second largest connected cluster (2nd LCC) as a function of the occupation probability 
p when attacked by IB (A and C, respectively) and ID (B and D, respectively). 
As shown in Figure 5A, the pc
IB increases faster than the pc
ID
 and when w is higher than 0.98, 
pc
IB become higher than pc
ID showing that the network becomes more vulnerable to the IB 
strategy than the ID strategy. Similar behavior is confirmed with the robustness measure R 
(Figure 5B). 
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 Figure 5: Simulation result for modular networks generated from BA network with N = 10000, m = 5 
and <k> = 4: (a) The critical occupation probability pc and (b) the single value network robustness (R) 
as a function of the re-wiring ratio w. The trend is clear, when w is higher than 0.98, pc
IB becomes 
higher than pc
ID and RIB becomes smaller than RID, showing that the network becomes more vulnerable 
to the betweenness-based strategy than the degree-based strategy. For illustration we present the the 
(C) (D) 
(F) 
(A) (B) 
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images of two modular networks subjected to node removal: with w = 0.6 and attacked by the ID (c) 
and IB (d) strategies; with w = 0.998 and attacked by the ID (e) and IB (f) strategies; In all simulation 
the occupation probability p is 0.6. 
Robustness as a function of network density 
Next we examine the effect of the link density (i.e. the average number of links per node) by 
simulating scale-free network of size N = 10000 nodes, number of modules m = 5 with varying 
average node degree <k> from 2 to 16 attacked by the betweenness-based strategy (IB). We 
found that pc decreases as the link density increase (Figure 6) - the networks become more 
robust when nodes have more links. However, the transitions type only depends on the rewiring 
ratio w and is relatively stable with respect to the average degree <k> change (Figure 6 and 7). 
In other words, the ratio of probability of inter-modules links over the probability of intra-
module links  (which is a function of w) is the critical factor to determine the type of the phase 
transition.   
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Figure 6: Simulation result by IB attack strategy for the modular networks generated from BA network 
with N = 10000, m = 5 with different value of rewiring probability w and for different node average 
degree <k>. Size of the 1st LCC (A, C, and E) and the 2nd LCC (B, D and F) as a function of the 
occupation probability p when attacked by IB for various average node degree <k> 
 
Figure 7: Robustness measures of simulation result (IB) for the modular networks generated from BA 
network with N = 10000, m = 5 with different value of rewiring probability w and for different node 
average degree <k>: (A The critical occupation probability pc and (B) the single value network 
robustness (R) as a function of the re-wiring ratio w for different node average degree <k>. 
By number of modules: 
Here, we generated scale-free network of size N = 10000 nodes and average degree <k> = 4 
with number of modules m varying from 2 to 20. We run node attack simulation by the 
betweenness strategy (IB) only founding that pc sharply decreases below w=0.98 regardless of 
the number of modules in the network (Figure 8). In other word, the network robustness (lower 
pc) sharply increases below w=0.98, that is when the network present lower modularity, thus 
reaching the maximum robustness for non-modular network. For this reason, the transition type 
is insensitive to the number of modules m, similar to the effect of network density. Moreover, 
we found that the critical occupation probability pc slightly increases with m, suggesting that 
the model networks become slightly more fragile when they have more modules (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: The critical occupation probability pc as a function of the re-wiring parameter w for different 
number of modules m in the network. The result is obtained with IB attack strategy for the modular 
networks generated from BA network with N = 10000 and <k> = 4. 
Robustness and structural properties in model and real-world networks: 
To verify the relationship between modularity, node degree, and the efficacy of the attack 
strategies we show above for model networks we investigate for such relationship also for 12 
real-world social networks (Table 1). We fit linear models of the robustness RIB against the 
modularity Q and the average node degree <k>. In Figure 9A we show the linear model of the 
RIB with respect to the modularity Q for our model modular network generated with different 
w from a BA network of N = 10000, <k> = 4 and m = 5. We find a significant trend as RIB 
decreases when Q increases (p-value= 0.01). Very interesting, in our real social networks 
dataset, we find a similar RIB decrease with modularity Q (p-value< 0.001). Remarkably, we 
find an abrupt transition in model network, i.e. when Q is very high (about 0.8), the network’s 
robustness drastically decreased (Figure 9A). We do not find this effect in real-world social 
networks (Figure 9C). The absence of an abrupt robustness RIB decrease in real-world social 
networks can be due to the fact that real networks may vary in link density and other structural 
properties (for example, transitivity, assortativity, number of modules, etc..) that may affect the 
network response to IB node attack. For this reason, the variability in real-world social 
networks structure, with many structural factors affecting the network robustness, may prevent 
the abrupt RIB decrease as a function of the modularity Q that we observe in model networks.  
Further, we find a clear RIB increase by increasing the average node degree in our model 
networks (p-value< 0.001, Figure 9B). This is in agreement with past analyses showing how 
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the network robustness to node removal increase with the linkage density, i.e. the higher the 
number of links per node, the slower is the network fragmentation under node removal (Albert 
and Barabasi 2002; Iyer et al. 2013). Differently, we do not find a significant relationship 
between RIB and <k> in our real social networks dataset (p-value=0.16, Figure 9D). Even in 
this case, the variability in real-world networks structure, with many structural factors affecting 
their robustness, may hide the emergence of a clear relationship between the linkage density 
measured by the average node degree <k> and the robustness of the network (RIB) against IB 
node attack. 
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Figure 9: Linear models of the robustness RIB as a function of the modularity indicator Q (RIB =α∙Q+ 
β, left column) and the average node degree <k> (RIB = α ∙<k>+ β, right column). Top row: model 
networks (panels A, B, red points); Bottom row: real-world social networks (panels C, D, blue 
points). (A) Model networks are generated with N = 10000, <k> = 4, m = 5 and with increasing 
modularity by varying the parameter w. (B) Model networks are generated with N = 10000, m = 5, w 
= 0.9 and varying <k> in the interval (4,32). Statistical outcomes of the linear model parameters 
(intercept α and slope β): (A) RIB vs Q: intercept α =-0.2, slope β =0.35, p-value= 0.01; (B) RIB vs <k>: 
α =0.01, β =0.14, p-value<0.001; (C) RIB vs Q: α =-0.26, β =0.37, p-value= 0.001; (D) RIB vs <k>: α 
=0.004, β=0.18, p-value= 0.16. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this work we study the robustness of model scale-free networks and real-world social 
networks with different modularity. The model networks are generated from BA model with a 
novel method for tuning their modular structure. Using Monte-Carlo simulation we simulate 
two node attack strategies, IB and ID based on node’s betweenness and degree, respectively. 
With both attack strategies, we found two types of percolation phase transitions take place. The 
1st order abrupt phase transition happens when the model network has high modularity, 
representing by κ > κc with κc ~ 23.8 for both IB and ID attack strategies. Also at and above 
this critical point, the model network is more fragile under betweenness-based strategy attack: 
RIB < RID, as found in many real-world complex networks. When κ < κc or when the model 
network has no modular structure, the network experiences a continuous 2nd order phase 
transition under both nodes attack strategies. Interestingly, under this regime, the network is 
more robust against the betweenness-based attack strategy IB than the degree-based attack 
strategy ID, contrary to most of results on real-world networks. In addition, our work showed 
that the ratio κ is the main factor for the type of phase transition: small κ corresponds to 2nd 
order continuous phase transition while high κ corresponds to 1st order abrupt phase transition. 
Further, we investigate how the modularity affect the robustness of the system against node 
removal in 12 real-world social networks and find a similar RIB decrease with modularity Q (p-
value< 0.001) that we observe in model networks varying the modularity. This result indicate 
how network with higher modularity (i.e. with higher community structure) may be more 
fragile to betwenness based node attack. At the same, this result show how the betwenness 
based node attack (IB) is highly effective when attacking network with marked community 
structure (higher modularity Q). Differently, in the case the network shows very low 
modularity (or no modularity), the degree-based node attack ID may perform better than IB. 
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This result helps to understand the role of modularity and community structure for the 
robustness of networks, to select most effective node removal in networks, and may shed light 
to the design of robust networks.  
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APPENDIX 
A. Prove that the rewired network statistically preserves the original node degree 
distribution 
Given a node with degree k, the proportion of inter-modules links and intra-module links of 
this node before the rewiring process are approximated by 
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
𝑘 and 
1
𝑚
𝑘, respectively, 
where m is the number of modules. A proportion w of its inter-modules links will be rewired, 
thus the expected number of links that this node loses is: 
𝑤
(𝑚 − 1)
𝑚
𝑘 
Similarly, this node can also be selected when links from nodes of the same modules are 
rewired. We compute the expected number of rewired links that this node can acquire as 
following: 
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- The total of rewired links in the network is 𝑤
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
𝑁 < 𝑘 > 
- The total of rewired links that will be connected to nodes within the module of the 
node is: 𝑤
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
𝑁 < 𝑘 >/𝑚 
- The probability that the node is selected is proportioned to the ratio of its degree to 
the total degree of all nodes in the module (according to our method) and is: 𝑘/(𝑁 <
𝑘 >/𝑚) 
- The expected number of rewired links that this node can be selected is therefore equal 
to: 𝑤
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
𝑁 < 𝑘 >/𝑚  ×   𝑘/(𝑁 < 𝑘 >/𝑚)   = 𝑤
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
𝑘 
which is exactly equal to the expected number of links that this node loses. In consequence, 
the expected number of links of each node after rewiring process is equal to their initial 
degree, and the network’s degree distribution remain unchanged. 
 
B. Graph of 𝜅 and 𝛼 as function of rewiring probability w and number of modules m 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of analytical and simulation results for modular scale-free network for A)  as a function of w 
and m to show and B)  as a function of w and m. Both measures show the goodness of mathematical 
derivation in the Method section. 

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